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█ Abstract In this paper we tackle the issue of the role of narrative language in the constitution of human 
subjectivity. There are at least two different approaches to this issue. The first one is consistent with the 
view that language has a unique constitutive role in cognition. According to this account, human subjec-
tivity is a by-product of the advent of language. We will refer to it as linguistic idealism and will argue that, 
in spite of its popularity in the philosophy and social sciences, this view is completely unfounded. We will 
defend a second approach, which acknowledges the relevant role of language in human subjectivity but 
interprets this role in the light of a relation of coevolution between language and cognition. We will sug-
gest that this relation is asymmetric and the priority is given to the cognitive foundations of human sense 
of the self. The influence of language on human subjectivity is then analyzed in terms of a retroactive ef-
fect. We will argue that the relation of coevolution between language and cognition provides an interpre-
tative tool that allows us to account for human subjectivity in accordance with darwinian naturalism. 
KEYWORDS: Language; Narrative Self; Mental Time Travel; Metarepresentation. 
 
 
█ Riassunto I fondamenti cognitivi dell’identità narrativa – In questo articolo affrontiamo il problema del 
ruolo che il linguaggio narrativo svolge nella costituzione della soggettività umana. Vi sono almeno due 
differenti approcci a questo problema. Il primo approccio si basa sull’idea che il linguaggio svolge un pe-
culiare ruolo costitutivo nella cognizione; in quest’ottica, la soggettività umana è un sottoprodotto 
dell’avvento del linguaggio. Definiremo questa tesi “idealismo linguistico” e sosterremo che, malgrado la 
sua popolarità in filosofia e nelle scienze sociali, è completamente priva di fondamento. Difenderemo allo-
ra un secondo approccio, che riconosce il ruolo significativo del linguaggio nella soggettività umana ma lo 
intende alla luce della relazione di coevoluzione fra linguaggio e cognizione. Questa relazione è asimme-
trica: la priorità va assegnata ai fondamenti cognitivi del senso di sé umano. L’influenza del linguaggio sul-
la soggettività umana sarà quindi analizzata come effetto retroattivo. La nostra conclusione è che la rela-
zione di coevoluzione fra linguaggio e cognizione offre uno strumento interpretativo che consente di 
spiegare la soggettività umana in accordo col naturalismo darwiniano. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Linguaggio; Identità narrativa; Mental Time Travel; Metarappresentazione. 
 
 
   
Studi 
 
1 Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstrasse, 150 - 44780 Bochum (D) 
2 Dipartimento di Filosofia, Cultura e Spettacolo, Università Roma Tre, via Ostiense, 234/236 - 00146  
Roma (I) 
E-mail: erica.cosentino@rub.de (); francesco.ferretti@uniroma3.it () 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale 
  Cosentino & Ferretti 
 
312 
█  Old and new idealisms 
 
The thesis that language is the core con-
stituent of human subjectivity is widely 
shared in philosophy and the social sciences. 
An influential account of the self has been 
defended by Dennett, who argues that hu-
man subjectivity has to be interpreted as a 
center of narrative gravity: 
 
And just as spiders don’t have to think, 
consciously and deliberately, about how 
to spin their webs, and just as beavers, un-
like professional human engineers, do not 
consciously and deliberately plan the 
structures they build, we (unlike profes-
sional human storytellers) do not con-
sciously and deliberately figure out what 
narratives to tell and how to tell them. 
Our tales are spun, but for the most part 
we don’t spin them; they spin us. Our 
human consciousness, and our narrative 
selfhood, is their product, not their 
source.2 
 
Dennett’s account of subjectivity is ac-
tually based on a more general idea of the re-
lation between thought and language. More 
specifically, this view is consistent with the 
idea that language has not only a communi-
cative function but also a cognitive function: 
it does not only express thoughts, it also con-
stitutes thoughts. The strongest version of 
this idea is the so-called Sapir-Whorf hy-
pothesis, based on determinism and lingui-
stic relativism. Although almost no one de-
fends the classical version of this hypothesis 
anymore, updated and revised versions of it 
have taken its place. Some versions of the 
“extended mind” hypothesis rely on similar 
grounds. 
According to Clark, the mind extends 
outside the skull: the external environment, 
in this perspective, acts as a “scaffolding” for 
cognitive processing, an “external support” 
by which the brain unloads its computational 
burden.3 An intuitive example of this form of 
scaffolding is represented by the pen and pa-
per used to cope with calculations which are 
difficult to resolve otherwise: while external 
to the mind, pen and paper become in this 
case part of the cognitive devices used by 
humans to solve certain cognitive tasks. 
Dennett is another supporter of the extended 
mind hypothesis. Both authors agree that 
language is a decisive external support of 
mental activities: 
 
Of all the mind tools we acquire in the 
course of furnishing our brains from the 
stockpiles of culture, none are more im-
portant, of course, than words – first spo-
ken, then written. Words make us more 
intelligent by making cognition easier, in 
the same way (many times multiplied) 
that beacons and landmarks make naviga-
tion in the world easier for simple crea-
tures.4 
 
In order to understand the idea of subjec-
tivity as a “center of narrative gravity”, it is 
necessary to focus on the notion of the con-
stitutive role of language in thought. This in-
volves focusing both on a certain hypothesis 
on the nature of thought and on the nature of 
language. Dennett’s thesis is based on a spe-
cific hypothesis concerning what language is. 
In sharp contrast with the thesis that lan-
guage expresses the intention of the speaker, 
Dennett comes to a radical hypothesis about 
the nature of verbal processes. In his view, 
there is no communicative intention prior to 
its verbal expression: the intention is rather a 
product of language. 
Dennett’s criticism of the myth of original 
intentionality emerges from the contrast be-
tween two interpretative schemes: the Pan-
demonium Conceptualizer and the Bureau-
cratic Formulator. The classical model of lin-
guistic communication – the code model – is 
a bureaucratic model. The internal boss 
thinks about something to say and the bu-
reaucracy of the language is in charge of say-
ing what the boss has thought.  
In the Pandemonium model, instead, the 
communicative intention of the speaker is 
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just the final product of a competition (go-
verned by a form of natural selection) be-
tween many words which struggle to obtain a 
place in the utterance. In a model of this 
type, the communicative intention of the 
speaker is unknown to the speaker himself 
until the utterance is actually expressed.  
As Dennett points out,  
 
[i]n the normal case, the speaker gets no 
preview; he and his audience learn what the 
speaker’s utterance is at the same time.5  
 
Communicative intentions are therefore 
essentially the result (and not the condition) 
of the verbal expression. 
Dennett’s proposal is clear: the relevance 
of the internal components of the mind is 
weakened by emphasizing the role of the ex-
ternal factors. Language is the most im-
portant of these external factors. The main 
purpose of his proposal is to rely on a poor 
and unstructured cognitive architecture in 
order to maintain a precise theoretical option 
concerning the nature of the mind: a model 
of cognition focused on the pervasive role of 
language.  
Dennett’s idea is that the most relevant 
properties of human cognition can be ex-
plained according to a process of “internali-
zation” of external structures which proceeds 
in a unidirectional manner “from the outside 
towards the inside”. 
Because of the constitutive dependence of 
cognition on language, the most important 
properties of human mind come to assume 
an “all-or-nothing” character: either one has 
a language or not and, consequently, either 
one has certain cognitive abilities that are the 
product of language or not. The all-or-
nothing character of this proposal qualifies 
Dennett’s thesis as a form of linguistic ideal-
ism: since humans are the unique animals 
able to speak, it follows that a number of 
properties that depend on language belong 
exclusively to our species. 
Against linguistic idealism, in this paper 
we will use a two step argument. Specifically, 
we will show that some of the properties 
supposed to be at the basis of human subjec-
tivity do not depend on the constitutive role 
of narrative language, for the following rea-
sons: (1) these properties exist in forms that 
are completely autonomous and independent 
of any typ of verbal skill; (2) these properties 
represent the preconditions for the evolution 
and origin of language, that is, without such 
properties language would not have the 
structure it actually has.  
This two step argument leads us to con-
clude that the role of language in thought has 
to be conceptualized in terms of a relationship 
of co-evolution based on the asymmetric de-
pendence for which cognition, both logically 
and temporally, always precedes language. 
Such a conclusion allows us to criticize lingui-
stic idealism and tackle the issue of the role of 
narrative processes in human subjectivity in 
the context of a naturalistic and evolutionary 
perspective.  
In the next sessions we will test the two 
step argument examining two cognitive skills 
involved in the construction of human sub-
jectivity: the ability to process meta-
representations and the ability to think about 
past and future events. 
 
█  Is metarepresentation a product of lan-
guage? 
 
Self-reflective thought is rightly regarded 
as one of the basic conditions for the con-
struction of the self. According to Clark, the 
role of language in this construction is exem-
plified by the idea that meta-reflection de-
pends on human specific communicative 
abilities: 
 
This “thinking about thinking” is a good 
candidate for a distinctively human ca-
pacity – one not evidently shared by the 
non-language using animals that share 
our planet. Thus, it is natural to wonder 
whether this might be our entire species 
of thought in which language plays the 
generative role – a species of thought that 
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is not just reflected in (or extended by) 
our use of words but is directly dependent 
about language for its very existence.6 
 
Given that the “thinking about thinking” 
involves the use of metarepresentational 
structures, an important preliminary step is 
to investigate whether metarepresentation is 
exclusively a product of language. Dennett 
responds affirmatively to the question.7 
Clark and Dennett are in perfect harmony in 
recognizing the role of language (like an ex-
ternal artifact) in the construction of the rep-
resentational structures at the foundation of 
the kind of reflective thought that both au-
thors consider the most important feature of 
humans beings.  
It is worth emphasizing that – appealing to 
the role of languages (and not to a language 
faculty) – both Dennett and Clark accomplish 
a further step in recognizing the primacy of 
external cultural factors. In their opinion, re-
flective thought could not exist without a pub-
lic (and as such external) language. According 
to Dennett, in fact, metarepresentations are 
the result of “shared thought”: 
 
What stikes me as clear enough is that 
there is one pathway to such florid think-
ing about thinking that moves from the 
outside in. It begins with overt, public use 
of symbols and tokens of one sort or an-
other (spoken words will do, perhaps, but 
only if they are used self-consciously), and 
creates practices that later can be inter-
nalized and rendered private. Since chim-
panzees, for instance, lacking language, 
cannot play these external games any more 
than lions can, they cannot use this path as 
a route to private or covert thinking about 
thinking. This line of thought fits hand-
somely with the recent emphasis by Andy 
Clark, and indeed by me (in Kinds of 
minds), on the claim that minds are com-
posed of tools for thinking that we not only 
obtain from the wider (social) world, but 
largely leave in the world, instead of clut-
tering up our brains with them.8 
This idea of a single pathway that “moves 
from the outside in” is at the basis of the ideal-
istic vision of the role of language in thought. 
Criticizing this form of idealism we do not in-
tend to question the importance of the role of 
language: what we intend to discuss is the idea 
that language is the unique condition of 
thought.  
Our proposal provides an interpretation of 
the role of language in thought in line with the 
continuist commitment that a reflection on 
subjectivity has to maintain in a naturalistic 
account of human beings.  
 
█  Metarepresentations without language 
 
The first step in undermineing linguistic 
idealism is to prove the existence of forms of 
thought without language. For what is at is-
sue in this paper, a good way to demonstrate 
such a form of thought is to prove the exist-
ence of metarepresentational abilities in non 
linguistic organisms.  
Premack and Woodruff gave rise to the 
debate on Theory of Mind in chimpanzees.9 
Their experiment was subjected to a series of 
criticisms that questioned the results, the 
theoretical assumptions and the methodolo-
gy. The basic problem is well summarized by 
Premack according to which an individual 
can reach a social relationship with another 
individual in two distinct ways: by directly 
modifying the individual’s behaviour; or by 
modifying the individual’s beliefs in order to 
act on her behaviour. Only this second case 
represents a proof of theory of mind.10 
Gozzano argues that “tactical deception” 
is a compelling way to settle the question 
about the theory of mind of non-human pri-
mates.11 According to Byrne and Whiten, an 
important distinction to make is between a 
“first level” of deception that is characterized 
by an intentional behavior (the intention to 
reach a goal that can be achieved only by de-
ceiving an individual) but lacks the “intent to 
deceive”; and a “second level” of deception 
characterized by the presence of such an in-
tention.12  
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According to this distinction, in order to 
have the second level of deception it is neces-
sary that the animal 1 wants (the animal 2 to 
believe that X) where X is false. Obviously, 
only the second level of deception guarantees 
the existence of a theory of mind. 
The question here is whether the experi-
mental data are consistent or not with the 
hypothesis that non-human primates are ca-
pable of this level of deception. For the two 
authors the answer is yes: chimpanzees are 
able to implement behavioral strategies that 
require the second level of deception. The 
most interesting cases in this respect are 
those involving the ability to “answer a de-
ception with another deception”.  
Another interesting case is that of a 
chimpanzee grappling with another who re-
fused to communicate information relating 
to an area with food: the first chimpanzee 
pretended to leave but as soon as he was out 
of sight, he hid behind a tree and began to 
spy on the other.  
This behaviour, according to the two au-
thors, reveals the attempt to deceive, but es-
pecially it suggests that an adult chimpanzee 
who hides himself has to have understood 
the other’s attempt to deceive.  
Although the debate on the attribution of 
theory of mind to non-human animals re-
mains controversial, it seems that the view 
according to which language is a necessary 
condition for metarepresentation cannot be 
supported by experimental results: apes seem 
to succeed in tasks that require metarepre-
sentational capacities, and apes do not talk.  
A point to be emphasized here is that 
claiming that apes show metarepresentation-
al skills it is not equivalent to claim that apes 
possess the same metarepresentational skills 
used by humans.  
That said, the most significant result of the 
empirical research on apes is the criticism of 
the idea (characterizing the “linguistic ideal-
ism”) that metarepresentations are all-or-
nothing. As we will see in the next section, 
human ability to use metarepresentations is 
just a matter of degree. 
█  Metarepresentational continuism 
 
Suddendorf and Whiten gave a relevant 
contribution to the study of the phylogeny of 
metarepresentations arguing that it is possi-
ble to include the issue in the framework of a 
continuistic perspective.13 The key point of 
their argument is the identification of a spe-
cific kind of representation which ensures 
the evolutionary transition from the level of 
primary representations to the level of full 
metarepresentations. The authors follow 
Perner in arguing that “secondary represen-
tations” can be interpreted as an intermedi-
ate level that allows children (by the age of 
two) to build a “mentalistic theory of beha-
vior” before they can exploit a proper “repre-
sentational theory of mind”.14  
The question asked by Suddendorf and 
Whiten is: can we attribute this intermediate 
level even to apes? After having reviewed 
numerous studies on the topic, the authors 
argue that the dichotomy between having or 
not having a theory of mind should be aban-
doned and in this way they maintain a form 
of metarepresentational continuism. 
Following Perner, three different represen-
tational systems can be distinguished to de-
scribe the ontogeny of child’s representational 
skills: the primary representations (those di-
rectly related to the perceptual system); the 
secondary representations (those that allow 
cognitive operations that go beyond the actual 
reality); the metarepresentations in the full 
sense (those that allow the child to meta-
represent representations as representations).15 
According to Suddendorf the same dis-
tinction can be applied in the case of phylog-
eny as well: with primary representations one 
individual simply perceives the actions of 
other individuals; with secondary representa-
tions she can interpret the behavior of others 
in terms of not directly perceptible mental 
states such as desires whereas epistemic 
states such as beliefs are still excluded at this 
level; with metarepresentations in the full 
sense individuals can appreciate the repre-
sentational nature of the mental states.  
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While the secondary representations pro-
vide multiple models of reality, which can be 
compared to each other (Suddendorf calls 
“collating mind” the processing system in-
volved in the use of this representational lev-
el), it is just through the use of metarepresen-
tations in the full sense that individuals can 
build metamodels, namely models able to 
represent not only other representations but 
also the representational relationships be-
tween these representations. 
The basic character of secondary repre-
sentations – which are particularly relevant 
within a continuistic perspective – is the ability 
to decouple the representation from the percep-
tion of the actual stimulus (the decoupling that 
Leslie puts at the origin of pretend play). 
This capacity allows new cognitive skills. The 
most important is the ability to think, 
through the production of alternative mo-
dels, about possible worlds which are differ-
ent from the real world in which individuals 
are situated.  
The properties of a cognitive system that 
makes use of secondary representations 
emerge for difference from the properties of 
a cognitive system that uses only primary 
representations. Detaching individuals from 
the situation actually perceived, a collating 
mind is a cognitive device that, producing a 
variety of alternative models of the scene 
represented, enables individuals to behave 
flexibly. 
Empirical evidence for secondary repre-
sentations comes from the comparative psy-
chology, as well as from the developmental 
psychology. Suddendorf and Whiten have 
shown that apes use secondary representa-
tions for a variety of tasks, including tactical 
deception, imitation and empathy.16 Given 
that chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas 
show abilities (such as pretend play or decep-
tion) that children reach during the second 
year of life, it can be concluded that apes and 
children of this age share a collating mind 
and that both are able to use secondary re-
presentations.  
As a result of these considerations, we can 
then hypothesize that some representational 
structures, which are distinct from metare-
presentations in the full sense, are functional-
ly and structurally more powerful than pri-
mary representations. Such a result gives us 
the opportunity to consider metarepresenta-
tions in terms of degrees (they are not an all-
or-nothing phenomenon) and, thus, to ana-
lyze them in a continuist account.  
The idea of a metarepresentational con-
tinuism leads us also to another result, that is 
the opportunity to consider the secondary 
representation as a pre-condition of the me-
ta-representation in the full sense. Consider-
ing the relevance of this result for the debate 
concerning the relation between language 
and thought, secondary representations have 
to be considered as the litmus test of the con-
tinuist hypothesis. 
 
█  Metarepresentation precedes language 
 
In the previous section we proved the in-
dependence of metarepresentations from 
language. This result allows us to perform the 
second step of our argument: to demonstrate 
that without a metarepresentational system 
human language would not be possible. The 
first move to do is to analyze what we have to 
intend by “language” in this context.  
A good way to face the problem is to 
study the transition from animal communi-
cation to human language. Animal commu-
nication is easily interpreted in terms of the 
so-called “code model”, a concept of com-
munication founded on the mathematical in-
formation theory of Shannon and Weaver.17 
According to the code model, the 
thoughts (i.e., the message) are encoded by 
the speaker in a succession of sounds that the 
listener decodes in order to share the thoughts 
that the speaker has intended to communi-
cate. Even though it makes sense to consider 
the code model as a model of animal com-
munication, it is totally misleading to consid-
er it as a good model of human language.  
The strongest reason is the fact that, as 
evidenced by Sperber and Wilson,18 human 
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language is founded on the crucial Gricean 
distinction between “speaker meaning” and 
“sentence meaning”. In the case of human 
language, the difference between what the 
speaker says and what she intends to say re-
presents the key to understand what diffe-
rentiates human language from animal com-
munication. For example, let’s consider the 
case of irony or metaphor. When someone 
says “This chair is as comfortable as sitting 
on nails”, it is plausible to assume that she 
does not want to communicate that sitting 
on nails really is comfortable.  
How it is possible to understand (despite 
the meaning of the sentence actually uttered) 
what the speaker really intended to com-
municate with this utterance? 
We have no other way than referring to 
the intentions of the speaker: to do this, hu-
mans have to possess a sort of “mindreading” 
device – a cognitive system able to use me-
tarepresentational structures. Empirical evi-
dence of the role of mindreading in language 
comprehension and production processes is 
offered by the pragmatic deficit of autistic 
individuals, who struggle to understand me-
taphorical and ironic expressions.19 
These considerations allow us to deal with 
the question of the relation between language 
and metarepresentation from a new perspec-
tive. Sperber provided an interesting contri-
bution to the debate, analyzing the topic of 
the origin of language.20 He proposed a two-
fold possibility.  
On the one hand, if we consider ancestral 
communication as a form of communication 
which is somehow equivalent to human 
modern coommunication (as the simplest 
form of modern communication), it must be 
admitted that ancestral communication has 
to be interpreted in terms of the same mech-
anisms operating on human communication. 
In this case, however, considering that to ex-
plain the ancestral communication we must 
“presuppose” the existence of forms of meta-
representation, language cannot precede me-
tarepresentation.  
On the other hand, if we consider ance-
stral communication, unlike modern human 
communication, as a form of communication 
based on the code model then it is not possi-
ble to recognize in our ancient ancestors the 
necessary condition  
 
to become aware of the representational 
character of their signals anymore than 
bees or vervet monkeys do.21  
 
In this way human language could never 
emancipate itself from the forms of animal 
communication anchored to the code model: 
 
If the ability to communicate linguistical-
ly had preceded the ability to use me-
tarepresentations, then this pre-metare-
presentational, ancestral verbal ability 
would have been radically different from 
the kind of verbal ability we modern hu-
mans use, which is metarepresentational 
through and through. The ancestral lan-
guage would have been a coding-decoding 
affair as are that many forms of non-
human animal communication of which 
we know. This, in itself, is an unattractive 
speculation since it implies a radical 
change in the mechanims of human lin-
guistic communication at some point in 
its evolution.22 
 
The metarepresentation is a necessary 
condition for the origin and functioning of 
language. Origgi and Sperber maintain: 
 
The function of linguistic utterances, then, 
is – and has always been – to provide this 
highly precise and informative evidence of 
the communicator’s intention. This im-
plies that language as we know it devel-
oped as an adaptation in a species already 
involved in inferential communication, 
and therefore already capable of some se-
rious degree of mind-reading. In other 
terms, from a relevance theory point of 
view, the existence of  mindreading in our 
ancestors was a precondition for the emer-
gence and evolution of language.23 
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The conclusion of this first part is that me-
tarepresentation (and the ability to mentalize) 
is a logical and temporal precondition for the 
advent of language. Given that without me-
tarepresentations there would not be lan-
guage, human communication cannot be con-
sidered the necessary condition for metarep-
resentations (contrary to linguistic idea-lism).  
Since the ability to metarepresent is con-
sidered a basic requirement of self-reflective 
capacity, the result of this first part is that 
self-reflection is a characteristic of human 
beings that cannot be interpretated in refe-
rence to linguistic idealism. The two-step ar-
gument used by us to criticize this form of 
idealism in the case of metarepresentational 
capacity will now be applied to the discussion 
of the crucial issue of human subjectivity. 
 
█  Reflective thinking and the challenge of 
subjectivity 
 
When Jerry Fodor was asked what was 
the role of consciousness in his work, it is 
known that he replied that it consisted main-
ly of a “Come on Jerry. It is like that Jerry. 
You can do it!”. Although Fodor’s answer 
was meant to suggest that consciousness does 
not have any relevant role in his philosophy, 
his answer is not unproblematic given that 
the problem of a theory of consciousness is, 
in fact, to explain how some contents, rela-
tively few, come to the awareness while most 
of the others remain in the oblivion.  
The explanation proposed by Dennett is 
the theory of the “Fame in the brain”, heir of 
the Model of Multiple Drafts.24 According to 
this theory, consciousness resembles fame, a 
sort of relative “political” power conquered 
by some contents during the competition for 
the control of the body. A theory of con-
sciousness has to explain, then, in which way 
certain contents obtain this power and man-
age to monopolize attention.  
Dennett’s idea is that some contents be-
come aware in the same way in which some 
people become famous: what matters is the 
debut’s follow-up. Specifically, the relevant 
part is the ability to create echoes of the event, 
that is, re-enactments or reverberations. 
It should be noted that a past event can 
determine the current behavior of an indi-
vidual without involving any explicit recall of 
the event itself. For example, a dog can re-
cognize his master’s smell without assuming 
that the smell awakens in him a memory of 
some past event. The smell could determine 
the behavior of the dog simply awakening a 
“visceral” joy associated with an event – with-
out the past event being lived again in the 
dog’s mind.  
The point is particularly significant for 
the general issues addressed in this book; the 
question under discussion is the dog's ability 
to remember, that is to create a reflective 
memory of the event. This is a crucial que-
stion given that, according to the theory of 
consciousness as fame, if an organism is ca-
pable of creating such reflective episodes 
then he is conscious as humans are. 
Dennett believes, in fact, that humans’ 
ability to recreate events in their minds is the 
most important feature of consciousness – 
the closest essential property of conscious-
ness to which we could ever get. It is worth 
noting that this is actually an empirical hy-
pothesis and it should be treated as such. 
Dennett also proposes a second empirical 
hypothesis, which concerns the way in which 
the ability to recreate events in the mind is 
acquired. In his account, the talent to repli-
cate events in our mind is the result of a spe-
cific habit learned within a certain culture: 
the echo systems through which events are 
replicated are in fact memes. The relevance 
of reflective thinking for consciousness is in 
agreement, then, with his notorious state-
ment that human consciousness is largely a 
“machine of memes” culturally transmitted.  
According to Dennett, consciousness exists 
only in this dimension brought to the public 
by our echo-capacity, which is determined by 
the intertwining of memes within narratives. 
Our objection to Dennett’s theory con-
cerns exactly this second empirical hypothe-
sis. We will show that the ability to reflect on 
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past events, which plays such a critical role in 
his theory, does not depend on language. On 
the contrary, language itself relies on pre-
existent self-reflection. The first step of our 
argument is to specify that the ability to re-
live past events – also known as episodic 
memory – is just a part of a wider mental 
faculty which also includes the ability to pre-
experience future events.  
This faculty has been called mental time 
travel and it plays a crucial role in the consti-
tution of personal identity.25 
 
█  Mind’s power to travel in time 
 
The relation between memory and per-
sonal identity is a traditional theme of philo-
sophical inquiry. The connection between 
future-thinking and personal identity has by 
contrast been less investigated.  
Let’s consider, though, what would hap-
pen to our sense of ourselves if we lost the 
ability to project to the future. Without our 
projects, our expectations and hopes, we 
would be completely detached from a huge 
part of what anchors the sense of who we are 
and where we are going. It might be objected 
that the way in which the future constitutes 
our personal identity is only similar to the 
way in which the past shapes the sense of 
ourselves. One could argue that there is a re-
levant asymmetry between the two dimen-
sions given that the future, unlike the past, 
has not been experienced yet. 
However, the difference between think-
ing-about-the-future and thinking-about-
the-past becomes less stringent if one consi-
ders that both are the product of a process of 
construction. The classical locus of the con-
structive theory of memory is Bartlett,26 but 
the most clear explanation of this theory is 
provided by Neisser when he compares the 
act of remembering to the work of a paleon-
tologist, who tries to reconstruct the entire 
skeleton of a dinosaur starting with only 
some fragments of bones.27  
The constructive nature of memory is 
confirmed by common mistakes which we all 
incur. Distortions, illusions and false memo-
ries do not signal a malfunctioning system; 
they rather reveal the nature of the processes 
involved and the functional basis of episodic 
memory.  
The latter is constructive because its main 
function is not to provide an accurate record 
of the past, but rather to provide elements 
which can be later used to simulate scenarios 
that may occur in our personal future. Since 
the future is not an exact repetition of the 
past, an effective anticipation has to rely on a 
system that can extract information from the 
past and flexibly recombine elements of pre-
vious experience within new representations. 
Recently, a growing number of studies 
have confirmed that the projection to the fu-
ture depends on the same cognitive and neu-
ral processes that are involved in remember-
ing the past.28  
These findings have led to reconceptua-
lize episodic memory in the context of a 
more general capacity for mental time travel 
(MTT). In the light of that, we believe that in 
order to investigate the processes involved in 
the emergence of personal identity we have 
to consider this broader capacity as a whole. 
Thus, the following paragraphs have a two-
fold aim. First, we will apply the previously 
introduced argument for the independence 
of reflective thinking from language to the 
specific form of self-reflection involved in 
the emergence of human subjectivity. This 
will involve showing that MTT is independ-
ent from language. Second, we will argue that 
MTT plays a relevant role at the foundation 
of language itself. 
 
█  Are animals stuck in time? 
 
Episodic memory is subsidiary to the ability 
to simulate future scenarios, as its main func-
tion is to allow the individual to anticipate fu-
ture needs. Most humans’ activities are indeed 
oriented to fulfill needs that are not experi-
enced yet but only anticipated. The question is 
whether other animals do that as well. 
According to the Bischof-Köhler hypoth-
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esis, non-human animals are limited to the 
here-and-now, and hence their actions are 
not guided by the simulation of what might 
happen in the future.29 One could argue that 
the behavior of many species disproves this 
hypothesis, as birds build nests, beaver build 
dams and many other animals act in prepara-
tion for the winter although they have never 
experienced the cold season. Although this 
reasoning is correct, it should be noted that 
these examples simply reveal innate predis-
positions or behaviors acquired through 
training or trial and error. 
The Bischof-Köhler hypothesis does not 
discuss the existence of this type of future-
directed behaviours. The claim is rather that 
animals are not capable of more flexible be-
haviours, which involve the ability to act ac-
cording to a mental representation of the fu-
ture (foresight). Specifically, the behavioural 
criterion for attributing to an animal the abil-
ity to plan for the future is the dissociation of 
his own current needs from the anticipated 
future ones. 
Interestingly, some birds have been shown 
to be able to anticipate the unfortunate situa-
tion of not being served breakfast the next 
morning in a certain room, and this is why 
they hide some food in that room the day be-
fore, even though they are not hungry at the 
moment of caching.30 Although this beha-
viour seems to indicate some degree of flexi-
ble foresight, it has been noted that birds’ far-
sighted decision is restricted to the domain 
of food-caching, which is a species-typical 
behaviour possibly determined by a combi-
nation of innate predispositions and acquired 
behaviors. 
So far, great apes seem to be the best can-
didates for MTT in other animals. As already 
said before, they have the ability to use se-
condary representations, thus they can de-
tach from the present and project to imag-
ined worlds, including past and future sce-
narios. 
Mulcahy and Call found that bonobos 
and orangutans were able to select the ap-
propriate tool to operate a device that di-
spensed grapes;31 later on, they carried the 
tool in a waiting room, where they were to 
spend several hours before being allowed to 
go back to the test-room in which the device 
was placed. After this interval, most of them 
remembered to bring the tool back to the 
test-room, thus indicating that they were an-
ticipating a future need. However, some cau-
tion is required in interpreting these results 
in terms of an ability for MTT. Suddendorf 
has argued that it is not clear whether the apes 
were actually anticipating the need for the tool 
or a future motivational state of hunger.32 
Given the current state of the art, it is not 
possible yet to make certain claims about the 
extent of apes’ ability for MTT. In spite of 
that, their performances on several related 
tasks reveal at least that human ability for 
MTT has precursors in other animals. Even 
this weaker conclusion is enough for our 
more general aim: if other animals are capa-
ble of at least some forms of MTT thus, gi-
ven that other animals do not speak, MTT is 
not a by-product of language.  
This is sufficient for our first step, the in-
dependence of mental time travel from lan-
guage. We can now proceed with the second 
step, showing the role of mental time travel 
in language. 
 
█  Representing events in language 
 
In this paragraph we will argue that MTT 
has a key role in language because it is in-
volved in the process of grammaticalization 
that led to verbal communication.  
The term “grammaticalization” refers to 
the process by which some expressions came 
to acquire a grammatical function. The em-
phasis on the role of grammaticalization in 
language evolution coincides with the em-
phasis on the role of linguistic change. The 
motor of the process is the individual speak-
er, who gives rise to an active interaction be-
tween language structure and language use. 
Empirical evidence of the role of this process 
in the evolution of language comes from the 
case of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL). 
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Without any exposure to a structured lan-
guage, in the course of about twenty-five 
years (starting from the opening of a school 
for deaf children) a transition from a form of 
gestural communication to a linguistic sy-
stem of signs was observed in the Nicaraguan 
deaf community. Nicaraguan Sign Language 
offers then a rare opportunity to investigate 
how fundamental properties of language 
emerge in the transition from non-linguistic 
to linguistic. 
A study by Senghas and colleagues com-
pared the expressions produced by groups 
belonging to different generations in order to 
find out how the combinatorial structure of 
the language is acquired.33 The analyzed ex-
pressions consisted of descriptions of com-
plex events of movement, for example, “roll-
ing down a slope”. Such events include a 
manner of movement (roll) and a path (de-
scending) which are simultaneous aspects of 
a single event, experienced holistically. The 
interesting fact is that the older group repre-
sented manner and path in a single gesture; 
the majority of the subjects in the two 
younger groups used, instead, two gestures 
assembling them within a sequence of ele-
mentary units.  
The youngest subjects showed, therefore, 
the segmentation and linearization typical of 
structured languages, despite the fact that 
these characteristics were absent in the input 
from the surrounding environment. The hy-
pothesis of Senghas and colleagues is that in 
the course of successive generations, children 
made this segmented construction the pre-
ferred way to express motion events, such 
that NSL quickly acquired the discrete and 
combinatorial nature typical of language. 
We should note that this change in lan-
guage structure causes at the beginning a loss 
of information, given that when manner and 
path are expressed separately it is no longer 
iconically clear if they are two components of 
a single event or describe two different events 
(rolling and then descending).  
However, the communicative power ac-
quired by means of the new combinatorial 
structure compensates for the potential am-
biguity. The segmented elements and the 
ability to put them in sequence provide the 
building blocks for complex linguistic con-
structions (phrases and sentences), the struc-
ture of which conveys a meaning that ex-
ceeds the simple addition of the individual 
parts. For example, in NSL simultaneity is 
expressed through a specific pattern of struc-
tured sequence. Hierarchical combinations 
are critical for language, because they allow 
us to produce endless expressions with a fi-
nite set of elements. 
The process of grammaticalization that 
allows the transition from a gestural system 
of communication to a sign language would 
not have been possible, according to Sud-
dendorf and Corballis, without a system to 
analyze complex events and break them 
down into constituents. MTT played this 
function.34 
The key idea is that events were initially 
only represented in an holistic way and kept 
in memory as unitary structures. The emer-
gence of MTT allowed individuals to repre-
sent events in a more flexible way as new 
combinations of already known elements. In 
this way, the particularities of each event 
could be taken into account by breaking the 
events down into their constituent parts and 
remembering them as different combinations 
of the same elements.  
The core argument for the role of MTT 
in language is that language evolved to com-
municate about specific events that occurred 
at a certain time and in a certain place.  
In order to efficiently fulfill this function, 
the structure of language has evolved to re-
flect the structure of thought. At least in part, 
therefore, the structure of language depends 
on the formation of a combinatorial system 
to represent events. Given that MTT gives 
the representation of events a combinatorial 
structure, it thus also gives language a com-
binatorial structure. 
This line of reasoning is consistent with a 
more general idea of the relation between 
thought and language that challenges lingui-
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stic idealism. In particular, since the ability to 
reflectively think about events is the most 
important feature of personal identity and 
since language is dependent on this form of 
self-reflection, it follows that language can-
not be considered the only constituent of 
personal identity. From this reasoning it does 
not however follow that language has no si-
gnificant role in the constitution of personal 
identity.  
On the contrary, we have already argued 
that, once acquired, language significantly af-
fects thought. If our argument for the cognitive 
foundation of language was successful, we are 
now in the position to acknowledge that this 
role has to be interpreted in terms of a retroac-
tive effect. In the last paragraph, we present a 
specific hypothesis about the cognitive retroac-
tive role of language in personal identity. 
 
█ Narrative identity 
 
The bi-directional relation between lan-
guage and thought is an asymmetric relation. 
Language acquisition and evolution relies on a 
network of cognitive faculties, among which 
MTT plays a particularly relevant role. Once 
language is acquired, though, it retroactively 
affects thought.  
In particular, we agree with the socio-
cultural tradition that narrative language sig-
nificantly contributes to shape personal iden-
tity. Given the asymmetric relation we have 
argued for, however, ackwnowledging the 
role of narrative language does not imply any 
form of linguistic idealism. 
Dessalles provides an interesting interpre-
tation of the role of language, identifying 
some constraints that the representation of 
events has to respect for the events to be nar-
ratable.35 Specifically, the narratability of the 
events is judged in the light of two crucial 
properties: the stories should be unexpected 
and atypical. These properties can be under-
stood, according to the author, as a means to 
influence the cognitive complexity of the sto-
ries: the lower the complexity, the greater the 
interest, because the events seem more unex-
pected and atypical.  
The relevant point is that narrating an 
event is not simply a means to communicate 
some unaltered contents. Given that there 
are some constraints in narrating a story, the 
fact of narrating it affects the way in which 
one thinks about the narrated events. The 
constraints discussed by Dessalless tend to 
illustrate the social function of the narratives. 
Individuals spend a fifth of their awake time 
in spontaneous conversations36 and a signifi-
cant portion of these conversations concerns 
past events.37 The commitment to tell stories 
is so considerable because those who succeed 
in eliciting the interest of others are preferred 
in establishing bonds of solidarity, because 
they show more informational capacity and 
experience in facing unexpected events. 
Other authors have emphasized that 
strictly linguistic constraints and narrative 
conventionality also play a significant role in 
shaping the representation of events, for ex-
ample the rules of enunciation which the nar-
rator must comply with and which are re-
sponsible for producing a good story.38  
These constraints have epistemic value, 
because they can be used as a source of in-
sight on the narrator’s own experience, lead-
ing her to consider certain aspects in a new 
light. In this view, the stories we tell modify 
and articulate the contents they are about, to 
the point that narration is not anymore only 
a mode of communication but becomes a 
cognitive system in itself. Therefore, although 
the origin of the sense of self is independent 
from language, at this stage narrative language 
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